| Sulphur system — the sulphur mines & concrete plant |
| Elemental sulphur, molten | Claus conversion of extracted SO₂ + H₂S; melting for concrete | Working range for concrete only 130–140 °C; stiffens above ~148–160 °C; ignites >~200–207 °C. Never add to a vessel with trace water (steam explosion) or hydrocarbons (generates H₂S) | Process at edge | HIGH — the product itself; solidify & stockpile as construction feedstock |
| Sulphur concrete (finished) | 12–22 wt% S + aggregate (terrestrial); lunar proposals up to 35% S / 65% regolith; ~70–80% strength in 24 h; remeltable ~120 °C | Cannot be used where temperature exceeds ~120 °C — equatorial daytime (+123 °C) is marginal. Vacuum sublimation (Grugel, NASA TM-2008-215250): ~<2 h to sublime 1 cm at 120 °C, years at ~20 °C; thermal cycling to −191 °C cut strength to ~20% in one test series | Use buried / shaded only | HIGH — fully recyclable by remelting; demolition blocks are feedstock |
| SO₂ — sulphur dioxide | Troilite oxidation; sulphur burning; Claus feed | Severe respiratory irritant. OSHA PEL 5 ppm TWA; NIOSH REL 2 ppm; ACGIH STEL 0.25 ppm; IDLH 100 ppm; NASA 7-day SMAC 1.0 ppm. Smell is not a safe monitor | Never store inside | MEDIUM — capture & feed to Claus → S + water; never stockpile as gas |
| H₂S — hydrogen sulphide | Troilite reaction; molten-sulphur headspace; anaerobic waste | Rapid systemic poison. Smell paralysed ~200 ppm; IDLH 100 ppm; OSHA ceiling 20 ppm; flammable LEL 4.0–4.3%. Heavier than air — pools low; enclosed headspace above molten S is assumed toxic and explosive until measured | Never store inside | MEDIUM — Claus feedstock |
| Sulphur dust (fines) | Grinding, solidification, block cutting | Dust explosion: LEL ~35 g/m³, autoignition ~232 °C; ignites from friction / static / spark. Combustible dust, not inert sand (NFPA 655) | Process at edge | HIGH — collector fines remelt directly |
| Slag / tailings, S extraction | Regolith heated 750–1,200 °C. Lunar sulphur is only ~0.05–0.13 wt% (avg ~0.10%), mainly troilite FeS — a by-product industry, not an ore bed. Extraction releases 12–30% of S at 750 °C, 85–95% at 1,100 °C | Hot, dusty, residual adsorbed SO₂/H₂S when fresh; co-volatiles (Zn, Na, K, Cl, F) on fresh material. Cool & degas in sealed edge bays first | Store at edge, by feed type | MEDIUM–HIGH — magnetite for iron, bulk residue for shielding / aggregate |
| Oxygen production — ilmenite reduction & molten regolith electrolysis |
| H₂-reduction loop / MRE melt | FeTiO₃ + H₂ → Fe + TiO₂ + H₂O at 900–1,050 °C; MRE silicate melt at ~1,575–1,600 °C. ~40 t high-Ti feed per 1 t O₂ (H₂ route) | Extreme thermal / molten-oxide splash; hot hydrogen loop; very large tailings stream. A polar base needs beneficiation or imported mare feed (ilmenite <1% highlands vs >10% high-Ti mare) | Process at edge — robotic | The melt is the ore body — process, don't store molten |
| Iron, silicon, aluminium, titanium | MRE cathode sequence Fe → Si → Al; TiO₂ from the H₂ route | Molten handling; Si/Al fines combustible; Ti fines pyrophoric as powder | Cast to ingot at edge | HIGH — first structural metal; Si for solar cells, Al for wire, TiO₂ pigment / photocatalyst. Ingots are clean and may travel inward |
| MRE / carbothermal slag & glass | Residual Ca-Mg-Al silicate melt, solidified | Hot when fresh; thereafter inert glass, dusty if crushed | Store at edge | HIGH — glass fibre, aggregate, shielding blocks. A primary mine-later pile |
| Hydrogen GH₂ / LH₂ | Electrolysis intermediate; recycled reductant | Flammable 4.0–75 vol% in air; detonable 18.3–59%; LH₂ boils 20.3 K — frostbite, ice-blocked vents, near-invisible flame, embrittlement (NASA Glenn Hydrogen Safety Manual) | Never inside | Consumable — recycle; working inventory only, at the edge, vented |
| Oxygen GOX / LOX | MRE, H₂-route electrolysis, OGA-type electrolysis | Not flammable — it makes everything else flammable. Oxygen-enriched atmosphere = >23.5 vol%: materials non-flammable in air burn at 23%; LOX at −183 °C soaks into porous material → impact-sensitive. Every O₂-service material needs a NASA-style compatibility assessment; O₂-clean, no hydrocarbons | Bulk never inside | Consumable. Only breathing gas at normal cabin composition (~21%, <23.5%) belongs inside |
| Water & ice — the polar ice is a chemical feedstock, not water |
| Raw polar ice / icy regolith | Mining the permanently shadowed floor. LCROSS (Cabeus): water 5.6 ± 2.9 wt%; abundances relative to water (=100): H₂S 16.75, NH₃ 6.03, SO₂ 3.19, ethylene 3.1, CO₂ 2.2, methanol 1.6, CH₄ 0.7 | The whole volatile suite below rides along. One impact, one crater — not a polar-wide assay; the base's own crater must be sampled before these numbers are relied on | Melt & distil at edge | HIGH — water plus every separated volatile below. Only polished potable water crosses inward (the ISS WPA model) |
| Ammonia NH₃ (in ice) | ~0.31–0.34 wt% of ejecta | NASA SMAC 7 mg/m³ (7–180 d); eye / respiratory irritant | Capture at ice plant | HIGH — the base's scarcest nutrient: nitrogen for the greenhouse. Capture, never vent |
| Mercury Hg (in ice) | LAMP detection; one compilation tabulates 0.24 wt% — treat as uncertain / instrument-dependent: instruments normalised differently, and “mercury ≈ water” mixes two different tables | Neurotoxic vapour. NASA SMAC 0.01 mg/m³ — 10× below the OSHA ceiling (0.1 mg/m³); EPA drinking-water limit 2 ppb. Never heated in an open system | Never inside | LOW / NEGATIVE — a purification liability, not an ore. Sealed toxic-bay stockpile, labelled hazardous. Removable (sulphur-impregnated carbon) — “polar water is poisoned” is as unsupported as “mercury is negligible” |
| CO · CH₄ · methanol · ethylene (in ice) | LCROSS volatiles, each ≤3.1% of water abundance (LAMP ranks CO most abundant by mass — different normalisation) | CO toxic (SMAC ~10 mg/m³ long-duration); CH₄ flammable 5–15%; methanol toxic (SMAC 9 mg/m³) | Separate at ice plant | MEDIUM — CO reductant, CH₄ propellant feedstock, methanol chemical feedstock. Small quantities — don't design the base around them |
| Greywater | Shower, handwash, laundry — a lunar base adds what ISS avoids | Surfactants → foaming that breaks physicochemical processors; microbial growth. Needs biological pretreatment (membrane-aerated bioreactors + RO treated >20,750 L in NASA exploration tests) | Process at utility node | LOW as a stockpile — value is water + N/P recovered immediately to hydroponics; stored greywater putrefies |
| Humidity condensate | Cabin dehumidification — breath, sweat, greenhouse transpiration | Low chemical load, real microbial / biofilm load (ISS biofilms clog the water system) | Polish & recycle | Water only — recycle immediately through WPA-type filtration + catalytic oxidation + ion exchange |
| Greenhouse & biology — Lewa's working chemistry |
| Nitrate salts — KNO₃, Ca(NO₃)₂, ammonium nitrate | Fertiliser stock; MELiSSA nitrification product is NO₃⁻ in solution | Dilute in solution: low hazard. Dry bulk: oxidiser — AN fertilisers are IMDG Class 5.1 (UN 2067); heated / contaminated bulk AN is the classic explosion precursor. Keep Ca stock separate from phosphates / sulphates (precipitation clogs lines) | Dry store at edge | HIGH — nitrogen is imported / ice-limited. Only pre-mixed dilute solution is piped inward |
| Phosphate salts & phosphate sludge | Fertiliser; phosphoric-acid urine pretreat; water-plant precipitates | Concentrated acid corrosive; phosphate leaks bloom any open water | Concentrate at edge | HIGH — phosphorus has no lunar source yet demonstrated; every gram is imported or recycled. The sludge pile is arguably the most valuable mine-later pile per kilogram |
| CO₂ — enrichment & scrubbing product | Crew metabolism (~1.0 kg / crew-day); Sabatier / Bosch; greenhouse dosing | ISS SMAC 5.3 mmHg (~7,000 ppm) for 180 d, with effects modelled below it. Plants want ~1,000–1,500 ppm, crew want <~1,000–2,500 ppm — greenhouse and crew air are managed separately, never one mixed atmosphere | Capture & dose by zone | Consumable — carbon is food. Bosch solid carbon: MEDIUM (filler / structural) |
| Sabatier methane CH₄ | CO₂ + 4H₂ → CH₄ + 2H₂O (~515 °C, ISS unit) | Flammable 5.0–15.0 vol%. ISS vents CH₄ overboard specifically because storing flammable gas onboard is considered hazardous — that venting is what keeps ISS open-loop | Never tank inside | HIGH at the edge — propellant (with LOX), fuel, H₂ via pyrolysis. Pipe it straight out |
| Digester biogas + digestate | MELiSSA CI-type liquefaction of faeces, inedible biomass, urine | Biogas typically 50–70% CH₄, 30–50% CO₂, trace H₂S / NH₃; volatile fatty acids corrosive; the digester is a live pathogen culture | Sealed, utility edge | HIGH — digestate (pasteurised) is the fertiliser loop; biogas is fuel. A process, not a stockpile |
| Ethylene C₂H₄ + plant volatiles | The plants themselves; ripening fruit; plastics off-gassing | The tightest threshold in this inventory: plant hormone active at ppb. ~60–100 ppb flecked wheat leaves (NASA KSC); control to ≤50 ppb; 250 ppb → 60% wheat yield loss; 500 ppb → no seed. The crop fails long before the crew notices | Destroy in scrubber | NONE — KMnO₄ / photocatalytic scrubbers in the greenhouse loop; spent media is Mn-bearing edge waste, LOW |
| Culture media, agar, microbial cultures | Biology labs; MELiSSA CII (Rhodospirillum), CIII (nitrifiers), CIVa (Limnospira) | Containment hazard, not toxicity: cultured organisms must not enter the greenhouse or crew flora uncontrolled; nutrient-rich media amplifies any contamination | Lab only — autoclave out | Spent media after autoclaving: LOW–MEDIUM (N/P to digester) |
| Algae photobioreactor waste | CIVa-type O₂ / food production (Limnospira / Chlorella-type) | Culture crash → NH₃ / VFA spike; decaying algae make H₂S in anaerobic pockets | Sealed reactors | MEDIUM–HIGH — harvested biomass is food / feed / fertiliser; never open troughs in living air |
| Human waste — the state of the art, stated plainly |
| Pretreated urine | ~1.5 L + 0.5 L flush / crew-day; pretreat CrO₃ + H₂SO₄, later CrO₃ + H₃PO₄, to stop urea → NH₃ and microbial growth | Pretreat makes it oxidising, acidic and Cr(VI)-bearing — Cr(VI) is carcinogenic. Untreated urine grows microbes “relatively quickly” (NASA) | Sealed — process at once | Water + N / P / K — process immediately, never open storage |
| Urine brine — the key stockpile | Urine-processor residue; ~22 L fills an ARFTA tank roughly every 3–4 weeks (6 crew). Brine processing demonstrated 98% total water recovery (June 2023) — a demonstration milestone, water-only, not total closure | pH ~2.0, high oxidation potential, Cr(VI) content → ISS toxicity level 2 (tox-2). Brine processors are designed for “safe containment of this toxic substance” with minimal crew manipulation | Never inside — sealed ARFTA at edge | MEDIUM, with a poison asterisk: dried salts hold N, P, K, NaCl — but Cr(VI) pretreat contaminates the whole stream. Design lesson: choose a non-chromium pretreat (or the MELiSSA biological route) if brine salts are meant to be mined later; otherwise the pile is hazardous waste, not ore |
| Faecal waste (raw) | ~0.03 kg solids + 0.09 kg water / crew-day | Pathogen load, odour / VOCs, gas in storage — the highest biological-risk routine stream. ISS does not recycle faeces: bagged, sealed, burned up on re-entry | Never stockpile raw | NONE raw. Only the sterilised product may be stockpiled |
| Torrefied faecal / solid-waste char | Torrefaction (mild pyrolysis) of faeces + wipes, paper, food waste; ultrasonic drying recovers 80–100% of faecal water | Dry, free-flowing, hydrophobic, does not support bacterial growth in tests; dust controls apply | Store at edge, sealed | MEDIUM — soil amendment / carbon stock / shielding filler |
| Regolith & dust — the boundary is the dust lock |
| Lunar dust (<10 µm) | All surface work, EVA ingress, mining, construction. Apollo: abraded seals, floated in the LM, “hay-fever” symptoms | NASA-STD-3001 limit: 0.3 mg/m³ in habitable air (up to 6 months intermittent). Freshly ground dust generates 2–3× the hydroxyl radicals of simulant, 10× quartz; LADTAG rat study: moderately toxic, NOAEL 6.8 mg/m³. Not a silicosis dust — ~50% amorphous silica; 2025 primary-cell work found no IgE allergy response. And no perchlorate hazard is established for the Moon — that is a Mars finding; don't import it | Never inside — suits stay out | NONE as a separate product — it is regolith feedstock. Keep it out of lungs, not in a stockpile |
| Bulk regolith tailings | Beneficiation reject, excavation spoil, sintered-block offcuts | Dust hazard only; otherwise inert silicate | Store at edge, graded by source | HIGH (bulk) — radiation shielding by the metre, roadbed, landing pads, aggregate, MRE feed. The largest mine-later pile by mass |
| Propellants & batteries — if present, they live at the landing zone |
| Hydrazine / MMH / NTO | Visiting vehicles only — a base that makes its own H₂/O₂ needs none inside | Toxic, corrosive, probable carcinogen, skin-absorbed. OSHA 0.1 ppm TWA (skin); NIOSH ceiling 0.03 ppm / 2 h; odour threshold ~3.7 ppm — over the limit before smell can warn you. Leakage classed catastrophic under range safety; fuel and oxidiser in separated bunkers | Never inside — SCAPE suits only | NONE — destroyed, never mined. Contaminated PPE is hazardous edge waste |
| Green propellants — AF-M315E / LMP-103S | Lander / small-vehicle alternative (HAN- / ADN-based) | Lower-toxicity, not non-toxic: energetic ionic liquids, potentially explosive crystalline (kept in aqueous blend), catalyst preheat >350 °C, decomposition ~1,600–1,827 °C vs ~900–927 °C for hydrazine. The gain: ambient handling without SCAPE | Landing-zone storage | NONE |
| Lithium-ion batteries (in service) | Rovers, tools, suits, backup power (NMC / LFP / LCO) | Thermal runaway: vent gas H₂ 36–54%, CO ~24%, CO₂ ~22–27%, CH₄ ~6%, plus HF / POF₃; onset ~190 °C in heated-cell tests; single small cells released ~3 L (LFP) to ~41 L of gas. Chemistry changes the hazard — LFP propagated without flame in some tests, NMC through every cell with fire — it does not remove it | Certified packs, vented lockers | In service — n/a |
| End-of-life / damaged Li-ion | Replacements, rover & tool retirement | Damaged cells are more likely to run away; Co / Ni content is toxic-metal waste. Never in general trash, never compacted — compaction can trigger runaway | Fire-proof edge container | MEDIUM — Co, Ni, Li, Cu, Al are genuinely scarce on the Moon. A legitimate mine-later pile if stored runaway-safe, segregated by chemistry (NMC ≠ LFP value) |